In late 1996, I headed up the 'Counter Terrorist and Internal Security Division’ of the Royal Hong Kong Police. That’s a sexy job title that belies a reality of paperwork, operational planning and endless meetings. Part of the portfolio covered contingency planning for the new airport at Chek Lap Kok. Thus by default, I landed the job of helping to organise the move from Kai Tak to CLK. This time-critical operation had Kai Tak closing just after midnight on 6 July 1998, and CLK opening less than six hours later.

All essential airport equipment left in the old airport for its operation must be transported to CLK in one single massive move. Thousands of heavy trucks, barges and vessels had to move through one of the world’s densest urban areas and busiest harbours. All this done at the height of the typhoon season. It couldn’t fail, because then CLK wouldn’t open.

Early in the planning process, I made a single decision that brought me considerable confidence that the operation would succeed. I decided that at each stage I’d have someone 'red team’ my plans. At that time I had no formal red team training; thus, the process proved hit and miss. As the plan developed, I’d drag non-involved officers into a briefing room. I’d run them through the proposals. Then allow them to critique my plan, asking  ‘what if?' 

A sudden work commitment interrupted one scheduled session. Thus, I dragged secretaries and the typing pool (still had one then) to review the plan. They spotted that by rerouting certain public buses, we'd impact staff getting to the new airport for the first day. The car-bound officer cadre missed that - a valuable lesson.

Other groups spotted issues of berthing for barges, crowd-control and measures for spectators.  The potential impact of ongoing construction on several important junctions came up. While one team suggested the need for heavy tow trucks at strategic points to clear obstructions.  All these findings led to changes in the plan and contingencies. In the latter stages of the process, I pooled a group of senior officers to test my assumptions, specific details and the level of coordination. 

It worked. Granted the weather favoured us; nonetheless, we executed the move with flawless precision. It was so successful that the magnitude of the event went unnoticed in the later mayhem of the opening.

As computers failed, baggage-handling went astray and the cargo facility ground to a halt, we shepherded cargo trunks back to Kai Tak. The cargo operation ran from there for some time until resolution of the troubles. The later inquiry praised our operation as the highlight of the opening. Tea and medals all round.

Discussing the preparations, it was evident to me that the red teaming had given us a distinct advantage. Even my somewhat unstructured process did the trick. Later, in 2010 I finally received formal training that affirmed my belief.

Thomas Shelling said it best “One thing a person cannot do, no matter how rigorous his analysis or heroic his imagination, is to draw up a list of things that would never occur to him.”

In reality, a wide range of factors - individual, organisational, cultural, situational - all contribute to poor decisions or weak planning. The wrong interpretation of data and evidence coupled with dogmatic adherence to concepts can doom you to failure. 

Red teaming offers an antidote. It provides an alternative analysis. My formal red team training introduced structured techniques that allow planners and decision makers to broaden the range of possible outcomes. You can then take steps to mitigate or remove threats. In short, you shouldn’t get taken by surprise.

Some of the tools red teams use include;

• Assumption checks

• Devil advocacy

• Team A vs Team B

• Contingency check - ‘What if’ analysis

• High-Impact/Low-Probability Analysis

• Scenario Development

• Red Cell exercises

Applied correctly, by an independent team, these tools smash the lens of preconception. The 9/11 Commission (2004) amongst many other investigations have asserted the importance of red teaming. Further, the US Congress has moved legislation directing the government to undertake red teaming in certain instances. 

To work effectively the red teams need:

• Subject Matter Experts

• To be separate from the primary group

• A clear set of  parameters and goals

• People who are prepared to challenge and be contrarian 

• To work throughout the project. Bringing them in at the end is probably too late.

The power of red teaming is critical to success in aviation security. Day to day we get lost in the detail of processes and systems, and then forfeit sight of the assumptions we are making. Red teaming is a practical response to overcoming the complex problems introduced by our human and organisational frailties. “Failing to plan, is planning to fail” to which I’d add “failing to red team, is also planning to fail”.