In 1983, I started my EOD career. At that time the public had little access to information on bomb-making or explosives. Those of us with a chemistry background could mix up low-grade material; initiation and detonation techniques were less well-known.  My instructors gave me excellent training. Besides, they encouraged us to find out what the ordinary citizen could conjure up bomb-wise. After some research, my colleagues and I started sourcing 'underground' books.

In ‘The Poor Mans James Bond’ author Kurt Saxon aimed to provide an encyclopedia of dirty tricks. Something of an odd fellow, he’d moved in and out of various right-wing and fringe organisations. His book talks the reader through car bombs, making poisons and reproduces material from U.S. Army self-defence manuals. He later went into producing CD-ROMs and still has a Facebook page.

Later I acquired ‘Improvised Explosives’ from a publisher in Boulder, Colorado. This informative book carried the caveat ‘for information purposes only!’ Yeh right. Written by a former explosives expert with the Israeli Army, the book takes you from ingredients to detonation. In simple diagrams, it teaches explosive production, booby-trapping and electrical timers. All this was available through the post.

This material is still out there with much of it uploaded to the Internet. But, these days such books are old hat. YouTube and other options on the Internet provide much more. 

In one YouTube clip, a group of hipsters are experimenting with the explosives. They'd taken instructions from the 1971 ‘The Anarchists Cookbook.' This granddaddy of the genre comes from the counterculture movement in the United States. The author, William Powell, later disowned his work, in part, because he’d created a manual for terrorists. But it was too late. He’d opened Pandora's box. 

The YouTube clips show the production of credible low-grade explosives and incendiary devices. These would be enough to bring down a plane if initiated at height. That this stuff remains available on such an open channel as YouTube is disturbing. 

Unfortunately, there is worse out there on the Dark-net. In nasty corners, amongst other evil stuff, is a treasure trove for the aspiring terrorist. Explosive production, priming and tactical plans for insertion are all there. Going along with this is guidance on defeating security measures including at airports. 

A hotchpotch of the disaffected handles the uploading and collating of this material. Black-block activists, anarchists, survivalists and disgruntled ex-military folks are all involved. Meanwhile, Isis and other terrorist groups are also busy. They are producing straightforward, easy to access training and guidance material for attacks. 

Thus any isolated suicidal kid sitting alone on a keyboard has instant access to this stuff. No longer does he need to venture to a distant training camp. He's not at risk of exposure by direct contact with a terrorist cell or by crossing borders. A ready to use ‘self-starter’ package is sitting there awaiting his decision to act.

In June 2017, Lloyd Gunton, aged 17, used material from the Internet to plan an attack in the name of Isis. His target a Justin Bieber concert in Cardiff, Wales. Gunton planned the attack in the name of Isis although he’d never converted to Islam. These days we need to tackle ‘remote radicalisation’ online. This process makes plots quicker to develop and harder to detect.  Would-be attackers like Gunton - the baby faced terrorist - can draw up their plans without ever meeting another extremist in person.

The security services have some success in tracking these ‘self-starters.' But it's a numbers game. Even with robust resourcing, sharp focus and a pro-active approach, a few are going to slip through. That’s why the security measures taken at airports to deter and prevent attacks remain vital. It’s the last line of defence.

In the next few weeks, I intend to discuss how aviation security needs to adapt to the evolving threat. In particular, the importance of shifting our focus towards people rather than objects.  Current security practices and technology seek to prevent specific objects that may be a threat from reaching a plane. Yet I'd argue it's the behaviour of people that should be the focus. There is an infinite list of possible restricted items.  By adding more and more, we are ignoring the role of people and how they may display a detectable threat. How we aim to do that needs discussing and debating.