The Missile Threat
The SA 7 ready to go.
The threat posed to civil aviation by missiles remains real. Although, a few simple mitigation measures can reduce that risk. In planning a response, it’s important to understand the nature of the threat. These include how terrorists may operate missiles and what's done to thwart them.
The Unintended Attack
But first, let us address the issue of the unintentional attack. History tells the higher risk to civil aviation is from the unintended attacks. This situation arises when flying over or near conflict zones. A missile fired at a military plane can go off-course or misidentification is the issue. The shooting down of MH17 is a case in point.
In that instance, the evidence points to a Russian ‘Buk’ downing a Malaysian 777 on 17 July 2014. At the time the plane passed over a conflict zone in eastern Ukraine. An error is a likely cause. These self-propelled air defence platforms boast their own radars and have a range of 72,000 feet. Flying near or over areas of conflicts presents an increased risk of an accidental attack. ICAO has excellent guidance on this issue in Doc 10084. The link is here.
While the risk of an accidental attack is low, the caveat is to avoid territory where conflict is taking place.
The Threat and Risks
Vehicle-borne systems such as the ‘Buk’ or man-portable types (MANPADS) all have military origins. The vehicle-based systems are not something that terrorists could acquire with ease. Operating these sophisticated items is difficult and requires significant training. They’re also challenging to hide. Even the Russians couldn’t hide their ‘Buk’ system as it moved around in Ukraine.
MANPADS are a different proposition. These man-portable systems are designed for quick deployment and need little training. Also, their capabilities are advancing. Even legacy missiles such as the Stinger have a range of around 15,000 feet. Newer systems like the British Starstreak can hit targets at about 22,000 feet.
Unlike the vehicle-based systems, many MANPADS have fallen beyond the control of governments. About 600 Stinger missiles remain unaccounted for. For example, the US gave the Afghan Mojahedin over 750 Stinger missiles in the 1980s. These missiles played a significant role in the fight with the Soviet Union. As the Russians withdrew in February 1989, the Mojahedin still held several hundred Stingers. In no time these missiles were either sold or passed on. Thus it's no surprise that MANPADS have found their way into the hands of terrorist groups.
The US did try to buy back its Stingers. It’s known that some went to Croatia, Iran, Sri Lanka, and North Korea.
No one has a reliable figure on how many MANPADS are in the hands of terrorist groups. In the wake of the Libyan uprising that ousted Gadhafi in 2011, rebels overran many military installations. In his weapon stockpile was 20,000 surface to air missiles. A full accounting of these weapons has not occurred including some 15,000 SA-7 MANPADS.
The Arms Control Association estimates that 47 non-state groups now have MANPADS. The evidence points to around 50 attacks against civilian planes killing about 1,000. Missiles are now so easy to get that it's a miracle, so few shoot-downs occurred.
Fortunately, it’s uncertain that a MANPADS launched at a civilian plane will bring it down. The 1978 Air Rhodesia Viscount shootdown is the first example of a civilian airliner shot down by a MANPADS. The pilot managed to make a controlled crash landing.
Using a MANPADS is not always a straightforward option. An array of factors come into play to attain success. The capabilities of the missile and the people who launch it are pivotal. Likewise, the altitude of the plane, its angle to the rocket and speed all affect the likelihood of success.
Moreover, MANPADS tend to have small warheads. Most of the weight of the missile is fuel and guidance systems. If you increase the weight of warhead, then you need more fuel to get the missile to its target. In the process, it becomes less portable. A small warhead may not have the knock-down power required for a large civilian aircraft.
It all depends on how the missile arrives at its target and the amount of damage it can deliver. Infrared seeking missiles will find a heat source, which is usually an engine. Earlier generations of IR missile had about a 20% success rate when fired against military targets. These days flares and other countermeasures can defeat the IR missile.
Some missiles do not need to have a direct impact. They explode in proximity to the target producing shrapnel. The British Starstreak flies at Mach 4 to release three tungsten darts, each with a delayed fuse and 450 grammes of explosive. The kinetic energy of such a high-speed impact is substantial. The airframe is unlikely to be able to sustain such a blow. In short, it would rip through a fuselage, and the plane would disintegrate.
Mercifully, none of the modern systems appears to have fallen outside government control. The SA-7’s missing from Libya are relatively dated with a range of 13,000 feet. This range restricts use to the vicinity of airports as planes land and take-off. In turn, this allows effective mitigation measures. High profile patrols and guarding at potential launch points can deter the terrorist.
Mitigating the Risk
Ultimately, risk mitigation based on the effective use of information and intelligence is the key. Prohibitive cost prevents hardening aircraft against a missile attack. Likewise, installing defence systems involves a significant investment that may not guarantee success. Jamming and warning systems are expensive.
ICAO Doc 8973 contains technical recommendations and procedures to minimise the risk of an aircraft being hit by MANPADS.
Identifying target planes and launch points allows the authorities to mount deterrent operations at times of risk. Success will depend on close cooperation. The security agencies, airlines, flight crew and air traffic controllers all have a role to play.
Besides, as a long-term measure, governments must ensure their stocks of MANPADS remain secure. Non-proliferation is key. States must put in place responsible export control policies. Such controls will reduce the threat posed by MANPADS as called for by ICAO Assembly Resolution A32-23.
Final Remarks
Eliminating the risk posed by MANPADS is possible. Effective counter-terrorism and AVSEC contingency plans are essential to mitigating the threat. Likewise, non-proliferation forms the most effective long-term approach. As always with AVSEC, international and regional cooperation is vital to ensure that measures are carried out.