Nobody Enjoys Airport Security!

As I discussed in my previous blog, the threat to civil aviation is evolving. As we put in place or enhance security measures, so the terrorists adapt. This is the trajectory of change since the start of aviation security. Recent attacks have seen the focus on landside targets. Both the 2016 Brussels Airport and Atatürk Airport attacks are examples. 

In response, landside security is getting a boost. Some airports screen those entering the terminal. Others mount surveillance at transport nodes feeding the airport to pick up signs of a threat. It’s estimated that in 2019 4.3 billion people will pass through airports worldwide. We need to ask the question, do all these people require screening? A reduction in the numbers screened should be possible.

As far as I can tell, no one appears to be discussing that. Each attack or attempt causes security to ramp up. Each time we commit more resources, while further disruption to operations is inevitable. In a sense, we’re stoking the fear the terrorist seeks to create.

This constant escalation is not sustainable. Further, it should be possible to identify passengers that are less risk and expedite their processing. This, in turn, frees up the workforce to focus on the designated ‘high-risk’ passengers.

Allied to this is the ever-expanding list of restricted items that cannot go airside. The ban on liquids is an example. We’ve also seen restrictions on certain types of electronic goods. In reality, the list of items we could ban from planes is limitless. Thus, unless we intend to keep expanding the restricted items list, an alternative approach is needed.

Let's recognise that our current aviation security regime is mainly reactive. The terrorist mounts an attack, we then pick a defence against such an attack. The terrorist then seeks a method to get around our guard. Our security measures only work if we cover the attack method adopted. If we get that wrong, we’ve wasted our money and time.

Also, if humans are a problem in aviation security why are we mostly relying on technology to make us safe. It’s the norm to respond with a technological solution while forgetting to invest in people.

I believe that ‘behaviour analysis’ applied in conjunction with other processes can help ease the situation. For clarity, when I talk of ‘behaviour analysis’ this includes an element of questioning to assess the integrity of passengers. This should allow for the spotting of ‘high-risk’ passengers that can then trigger further checks. We are already using this on some flights at check-in.  

‘Behavior analysis’, focused on humans, is agnostic on the method of attack. In that sense, you don’t need to stay ahead of the bad guys because you are looking for signs in their conduct that raises alarms. 

Passengers exhibiting suspicious behaviour are then taken aside for targeted interrogation and search. These techniques can help determine, intelligently, which technology to use on which passenger. The process allows for a more rational approach, instead of putting everyone through the mill.

For this to work, a mindset change must take place. The boundary for the application of aviation security is currently at the landside/airside interface. Protection in-depth needs to be the future approach. Moreover, all processes associated with civil aviation must have an element of security awareness. 

ICAO has the lead role to play in the drive for consistent worldwide standards.  ICAO is currently only asking for the certification of screeners. That needs to change with an upgrade of all staff involved with aviation security. Each component of the process must be subject to accreditation; otherwise, we cannot assure standards. A few nations exceed the ICAO requirements, while many others meet basic standards only. Like any system, aviation security is as strong as its weakest component. Plus, with aviation security, you import the product of all connecting airports. 

There is another factor at play that we cannot ignore. The airport security process is stressful. Passengers dislike it, and there is evidence it may contribute to willful conduct. Some folks feel the process is intrusive and demeaning. Moreover, having everyone stressed and on edge makes it problematic to spot those people who may present a genuine threat. 

We need to look at ways of easing the mood without compromising security so that those who are exhibiting behavioural signs of a risk stand out. That should be possible. 

In my experience, Singapore and Hong Kong airports operate security regimes that are less tense than elsewhere. Both places also have world-class security. Staff attitude is the critical factor. For instance, greater emphasis on the customer service and simple politeness will help calm the atmosphere. 

In the same way, a single queue helps. It’s a strange trait of humans that we always perceive the line next to us is moving quicker. This sentiment triggers a sense of unfairness that sullies our mood. Tests have shown that people deem single queues as fair. 

I’d envisage future aviation security regimes using ‘behaviour analysis’ at all stages of the airport experience. Landside patrols would observe people in carparks and other insecure areas for signs of untoward behaviour. Likewise, shop staff and cleaners should have incentives to be vigilant and simple tips what to look for. 

One airport is harnessing its aircraft spotters. These guys are on site every day hanging around and watching the activity. They are familiar with the routine of the airport and its surroundings. Anything unusual soon comes to their attention. The airport has provided them with contact cards for quick access to the security teams to report any odd sighting. This smart initiative is a low-cost potentially high-return option.

Likewise, ‘ behaviour analysis’ can deal with the insider threat. Managers and supervisors need to be trained to recognise staff who radicalise. In particular, baggage handlers and loaders all have access to the plane.

Unfortunately, some people still associate ‘behaviour analysis’ with profiling. Yet, it’s not. The process, when correctly taught and applied, focuses on behaviour, not skin colour, racial group or other ethnic markers. People need to understand that distinction.

Somebody recently asked me “Can you foresee a time when I can fly without having the trauma of airport security? The short answer is “No.” But I do believe we can make the process less stressful. With some 4.3 billion people passing through our hands in 2019, and more in the future, change will come.